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Differential Voting Right Shares in India — Legal and Valuation Perspective 
Manick Wadhwa and Ankit Wadhwa 
Introduction 
To summarise in a few words, DVR shares are merely the same shares of a company, having, 
mutatis mutandis, all the rights and privileges that are vested in the ordinary shares of the 
Company, except as to voting and in some cases, dividends. 
The Difference 
In India, a company can only issue DVR, a.k.a. Differential Voting Rights, shares that offer fewer 
voting rights than ordinary shares of the same company. The holders of the equity shares with 
differential rights enjoy all other rights such as bonus shares, rights shares etc., which the holders 
of ordinary equity shares are entitled to.1 
Figure 1 
Script Differential Voting Rights Differential Dividends 
Tata Motors Limited 
One Vote for every 10 
DVR Equity Shares 
5% higher than the rate of 
dividend declared on 
ordinary Shares 
Jain Irrigation Systems 
Limited 
One Vote for every 10 
DVR Equity Shares 
Same as Ordinary shares 
Future Enterprises Limited 
Three Votes for every Four 
DVR Equity Shares 
2% higher than the rate of 
dividend declared on 
ordinary Shares2 
                                                 
1 Rule 4(5) of the Companies (Share Capital and Debentures) Rules, 2014 
2 The Company may declare dividend only for DVR Share of upto 2% without declaring any dividend for ordinary 
Shares 
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Historically, the discount between the ordinary shares and DVR shares of public limited companies 
in India has been between 35-45%. However, as shown in figure 2, this discount has narrowed 
considerably for Future Enterprises Limited in recent times. 
Figure 2 
Script 
CMP 
Ordinary 
Share 
CMP 
DVR Share 
Discount 
(%) 
Tata Motors Limited 270.75 161.85 40.22 
Jain Irrigation Systems Limited 86.85 53.50 38.40 
Future Enterprises Limited 37.40 36.70 1.87 
CMP – Current Market Price (in INR) as on 27 June, 2018 
Returns 
Since the listing of DVR shares, ordinary shares of Tata Motors Limited have given a return of 
approximately 763%, whereas its DVR shares have only returned 185%.3 Similarly, for Jain 
Irrigation Systems Limited, the ordinary shares have returned -32.96% whereas the DVR shares 
have yielded 2.6%. 
Ideally, the movement in the two shares, i.e. ordinary share and DVR share, should mirror each 
other. However in India, on an average, only 63.83% of the returns of DVR shares is explained by  
returns of the ordinary shares.4 In the US, returns of Alphabet Inc’s Class A stock explains 98.14% 
of the returns of the Class C stock,5 where Alphabet Inc’s Class A share has gained 2027% and its 
class C share has given a return on 2002% since the listing of its dual class share. 
A possible explanation for this mismatch is that the DVR stocks of Indian listed public companies 
are not understood and tracked by Investors. 
                                                 
3 Annexure A 
4 Annexure B  
5 Regressing weekly returns of Alphabet Inc’s Class A stock and Class C stock for the past 3 years. 
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Legal Framework 
The regulatory environment in India requires fulfilment of certain strict requirements, with a high 
bar for corporate governance, to issue shares with differential voting rights.  
For instance, under the 2014 rules, the shares with differential rights cannot exceed twenty-six 
percent of the total post-issue paid up equity share capital including equity shares with differential 
rights issued at any point of time.6 Similarly, to issue DVR shares, the company should have a 
consistent track record of distributable profits for the preceding three years of such issue.7 A 
company should also not have been penalized by any sectoral regulators such as SEBI, RBI, etc.8 
Moreover, various provisions of the Companies Act 2013 protect the rights of shareholders 
belonging to a different class. For instance, Section 48 states, inter alia, that the rights attached to 
the shares of any class may be varied with the consent in writing of the holders of not less than 
three-fourths of the issued shares of that class or by means of a special resolution passed at a 
separate meeting of the holders of the issued shares of that class. Therefore, it can be inferred that 
the shareholders of the DVR shares, in effect, have an absolute vote in cases where any of the 
rights of such shareholders are varied. 
Valuation 
If the primary reason for the voting share premium is the expected value of control, in general, 
there are two ways by which we can value DVR shares. First, we can use the empirical findings 
on the voting share premium in markets and arrive at a reasonable value for voting rights. Second, 
it can be said that the voting right premium is an extension of the expected value of control and 
that estimating that value should allow us to quantify the premium.9 
                                                 
6 Rule 4(1)(c) of the Companies (Share Capital and Debentures) Rules, 2014 
Under the Companies (Issue of Share Capital with Differential Voting Rights) Rules, 2001, the shares with 
differential voting rights could not exceed 25% of the total share capital issued 
7 Rule 4(1)(d) of the Companies (Share Capital and Debentures) Rules, 2014 
8 Rule 4(1)(h) 
9 Damodaran, Aswath, The Value of Control: Implications for Control Premia, Minority Discounts and Voting Share 
Differentials (June 30, 2005). Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.837405 
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The expected value of control is the product of the probability of control changing the value of 
changing management at a firm:  
Expected value of control = Probability of management changing * Value of management change  
Where, Value of management change = Optimal firm value – Status quo value  
As regards difference in voting rights, Damodran (2008)10 states that:  
• The difference between voting and non-voting shares should go to zero if there is no chance 
of changing management/control 
• Other things remaining equal, voting shares should trade at a larger premium on nonvoting 
shares at badly managed firms than well-managed firms 
• Any event that illustrates the power of voting shares relative to non-voting shares is likely 
to affect the premium at which all voting shares trade 
• Other things remaining equal, the smaller the number of voting shares relative to nonvoting 
shares, the higher the premium on voting shares should be 
According to Nenova (2003), the value of control-block votes is expected to decrease with the 
strictness of the legal environment. In particular, such strictness includes better general investor 
protection, higher quality of law enforcement, and stricter takeover laws.11 
Global Scenario 
In a comparative study of voting premiums across 661 companies in 18 countries, it was found 
that the median value of control block votes varies widely across the countries, ranging from less 
than 1% in the US to 25% or greater in France, Italy, Korea, and Australia. 12 
Lease, McConnell, and Mikkelson (1983) found that voting shares in the United States trade, on 
average, at a relatively small premium of 5-10% over non-voting shares. They also found extended 
                                                 
10 Damodaran, Aswath, supra 
11 Nenova, T., 2003, The value of corporate voting rights and control: A cross-country analysis, Journal of Financial 
Economics 
12 ibid 
 5 
periods where the voting share premium disappeared or voting shares traded at a discount to non- 
voting shares.13 
Figure 3 
Script 
CMP 
Primary 
CMP 
Secondary 
Discount 
(%) 
Alphabet Inc.14 1,129.19 1,115.65 1.12 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc.15 282,040.01 
279,975.00 
(186.65*1500) 
0.73 
Under Armour Inc.16 22.07 20.75 5.98 
CMP – Current Market Price (in USD) as on 29 June, 2018 
The legal environment is the key factor in explaining differences across countries and the voting 
premium is smaller in countries with better legal protection for minority and non-voting 
stockholders and larger for countries without such protection.17 
Only recently, with the increase in dual class structures in the technology sector worldwide, 
Singapore and Hong Kong have allowed companies with dual-class share structures to list on their 
respective stock exchanges. 
Conclusion 
The regulatory framework in India protects the rights of the dual class shareholders, as well as the 
minority shares. For example, in the United States, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Class A equity 
shareholders can convert their shares into class B equity shares, having fewer voting rights. 
                                                 
13 Lease, R.C., J.J. McConnell and W.H. Mikkelson 1983, The market value of control in publicly-traded 
corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, v11, 439-471. 
14 Vote per Share - Class A: 1 Class C: no votes 
15 Vote per Share - Class A: 1 Class B: 1500/10,000 
Buffett, Warren, Memo Subject: Comparative Rights and Relative prices of Berkshire Class A and Class B Stock, 
Dated February 2, 1999 
16 Vote per Share - Class A: 1 Class C: no votes 
17 Nenova, T., 2003, The value of corporate voting rights and control: A cross-country analysis, Journal of Financial 
Economics 
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However, under the Indian Law, a company cannot convert its existing equity share capital with 
voting rights into equity share capital carrying differential voting rights and vice versa.18 
Considering the strict corporate governance requirements for Companies to list dual class shares 
in India and the various laws protecting the rights of DVR shareholders against hostility, it can be 
argued that the discount of 35-45% for DVR shares is a bit excessive. This might be partly 
explained by the fact that these shares are not understood and tracked by Investors, and that we 
might see the discount narrowing once there is more awareness about the features of such shares 
in the market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disclaimer: The views expressed here are solely those of the authors in their private capacity and do not in any way 
represent the views of SKI Capital Services Limited. The research is not intended to be an investment recommendation. 
The author(s) have financial interest in the Indian entities mentioned in this report. The authors can be reached at 
research@skicapital.net  
                                                 
18 Rule 4(3) of the Companies (Share Capital And Debentures) Rules, 2014 
Also see, The Companies (Issue of Share Capital with Differential Voting Rights) Rules, 2001 
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Annexure A 
 
Performance of DVR shares in India 
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Performance of Dual Class shares in USA 
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Annexure B 
 
Regression Statistics19 
 
 
Tata Motors Limited  
 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.862 
R Square 0.743 
Adjusted R Square 0.742 
Standard Error 0.025 
Observations 259 
 
Jain Irrigation Systems Limited 
 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.806 
R Square 0.649 
Adjusted R Square 0.648 
Standard Error 0.036 
Observations 259 
 
Future Enterprises Limited 
 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.723 
R Square 0.523 
Adjusted R Square 0.521 
Standard Error 0.060 
Observations 259 
 
 
  
                                                 
19 Using 5-year weekly returns, where return on DVR is the dependent variable and return on ordinary share is the 
independent variable. 
